In this paper we consider the Coase theorem in a non cooperative game framework. In particular, we explore the Coase theorem with respect to the final distribution of alienable property rights which constitutes, as far as we know, a less cultivated field of research. In our framework, in order to reach efficiency, agents have to stipulate binding contracts (temporary or permanent). We show under our payoff conditions the role of binding contracts (permanent and temporary) in the final attribution of individual rights.

Coase theorem and exchangeable rights in non-cooperative games

GUZZINI, ENRICO;
2012-01-01

Abstract

In this paper we consider the Coase theorem in a non cooperative game framework. In particular, we explore the Coase theorem with respect to the final distribution of alienable property rights which constitutes, as far as we know, a less cultivated field of research. In our framework, in order to reach efficiency, agents have to stipulate binding contracts (temporary or permanent). We show under our payoff conditions the role of binding contracts (permanent and temporary) in the final attribution of individual rights.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11389/1280
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