The article examines the implications of the creation in 2017 of a 'Permanent Structured Cooperation on security and defence' (PESCO), that could lead to the gradual construction of a European Army. In particular, it focuses on the institutional issues linked to the possibility of deploying European armed forces in conflict scenarios and analyses the governance of the European common security and defence policy. In this respect, the decision-making power in matters of common defence and PESCO is concentrated in the hands of the Council and of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, without the European Parliament being directly involved in the relevant decision-making processes. The article aims to illustrate the constitutional reasons in favour of greater involvement of the European Parliament in this area. Moreover, it will evaluate the ways in which the democratic control on future EU military missions could be increased.
|Titolo:||PESCO and the Prospect of a European Army: the ‘Constitutional Need’ to Provide for a Power of Control of the European Parliament on Military Interventions|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2020|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||1.1 Articolo in rivista|